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Abstract 
The Queensland Building Services Authority (QBSA) regulates the construction industry 
in Queensland, Australia, with licensing requirements creating differential financial reporting, 
depending on firm size. Economic theories of regulation and behaviour provide a framework 
for investigating effects of the financial constraints and financial reporting requirements 
imposed by QBSA licensing. Data are analysed for all small and medium construction 
entities operating in Queensland between 2001 and 2006. Findings suggesting that 
construction licensees are categorising themselves as smaller to avoid the more onerous and 
costly financial reporting of higher licensee categories are consistent with US findings from 
the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) regulation which created incentives for small firms to stay 
small to avoid the costs of compliance with more onerous financial reporting requirements. 
Such behaviour can have the undesirable economic consequences of adversely affecting 
employment, investment, wealth creation and financial stability. Insights and implications 
from the analysed QBSA processes are important for future policy reform and design, and 
useful to be considered where similar regulatory approaches are planned.  
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Introduction 
Public interest theory views regulation as necessary to correct the market failures that 
cause market inefficiencies and inequities (Posner, 1974). In seeking to maximise social 
welfare, the costs of regulation are traded off against the social benefits of improving market 
efficiencies (Scott, 2006). In the business environment, regulation is intended to promote 
efficiency and equity among the various participants engaged in economic activity (e.g. 
International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation, 2006, p.1; Mossialos et al., 2004). 
While regulation seeks to correct market failures, it may also have unintended economic 
consequences of creating more resource misallocations than the regulation initially addressed 
(Pelzman, 1976). Thus policy-makers and regulators are faced with the fine balancing act of 
developing regulation that meets efficiency and equity objectives that is also not overly costly 
to the regulated enterprises.   
The economic consequences of regulation have been the subject of considerable research in 
the accounting and disclosure literature since Zeff’s (1978) seminal paper. That body of 
research includes studies that have examined how prescribed accounting standards, security 
codes and tax codes impact on economic decisions of corporate managers. Some examples 
are a decline in the use of capital leases when capitalisation of such leases and reporting them 
in the firm’s financial statements became mandatory (Imhoff and Thomas, 1988), timing of 
asset sales to smooth year-to-year reported earnings (Bartov, 1993), and adjusting security 
holdings in response to changes in tax rates (Scholes et al., 1992). More recent research 
examines the economic consequences of SOX, which introduced stringent corporate 
governance and financial requirements on public companies. Zhang’s (2007) findings suggest 
that compliance with SOX imposes net costs on firms. This body of research highlights how 
regulation that is intended to promote and improve market efficiencies can have adverse 
economic consequences.  
3 
 
The economic consequences of regulation literature provides a framework for 
investigating the consequences of regulation in the construction industry. In many countries, 
business activities in the construction industry are regulated through various codes and 
licensing requirements imposed by national or local authorities (Wells, 2007). In Australia, 
individuals and organisations engaged in construction business activities (above a minimal 
dollar amount) are required to be licensed by relevant authorities of the State(s) in which they 
operate. In Queensland, QBSA is the responsible regulatory body and was established under 
the Queensland Building Services Authority Act 1991. Among the Australian States, the 
QBSA construction industry regulatory framework is considered to be a leader in the field 
that provides a model for the other States. The QBSA regulation categorises licensees in 
accordance with size, based on tangible assets held in the business, and limits the allowable 
turnover within those categories, to limit the risk of the businesses exceeding their operating 
capacity. Differential financial reporting and audit requirements also apply across the various 
categories of licensees.  
The objective of this study is to examine whether the financial constraints and financial 
reporting requirements of QBSA licensing have had unintended consequences. Economic 
theories of regulation, which have been applied in prior research on the effects of financial 
reporting regulation, provide the conceptual framework and are discussed at the outset. A 
detailed introduction and discussion to QBSA licensing requirements, processes and data is 
followed by an analysis of four issues which demonstrate that the licensing requirements 
inhibit growth and have broader adverse economic effects. The conclusion part reconciles the 
findings with prior literature on economic consequences of regulation.   
 
Regulation and information asymmetry 
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Economic theories suggest that under efficient market conditions, competitive forces will 
create and sustain Pareto-efficient market allocations, but when this condition fails to hold 
and markets become inefficient, there is scope for government intervention (Sappington and 
Stiglitz, 1987). In such situations, regulation is supplied in response to public demands to 
correct inefficient or inequitable market practices (Posner, 1974), commonly referred to as 
market failures. Market failures occur when there is ‘imperfect information’, preventing 
market participants from making efficient market decisions (Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987). 
Information asymmetry arises where insiders of organisations have more information about 
the business than outsiders, which could lead to the two problems of adverse selection and 
moral hazard. Adverse selection occurs where insiders exploit their inside information 
knowledge to the disadvantage of outsiders. Moral hazard arises where outsiders are unable 
to directly observe the extent and quality of efforts of insiders.  Disclosure regulation seeks to 
reduce information asymmetry by requiring entities to publicly disclose information that they 
otherwise would be unwilling (e.g. bad news) to disclose.    
While market failure is used to justify regulation, it has conversely been argued that 
significant market interventions by governments can lead to regulatory failure (Pelzman, 
1976; Posner, 1974). Where the anticipated benefits of regulation are not realised, or 
regulation has unanticipated adverse consequences, the regulation would be seen as failed; 
for example, when costs of compliance with regulation exceed any benefits. Thus regulation 
is argued to be necessary to correct market failures, but there is a risk that regulation will 
result in sub-optimal outcomes.  
The construction industry is subject to a wide range of regulation aimed at protecting the 
interests of various participants in the industry and the broader public interest. Regulatory 
intervention is seen to be justified on the basis of complex information and information gaps, 
where it is difficult for consumers to assess and understand the quality of construction work, 
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and accordingly minimum standards are set by regulation (Productivity Commission, 2004). 
In addition to setting standards in the form of building codes, those who provide building 
services are also regulated through licensing. Such regulation is considered to constrain 
business activity, but alternatively it enables and motivates business performance by making 
it easier for service providers to access and deploy resources, and by creating market 
opportunities (Small Business Research Centre, 2008).      
 
Queensland construction business licensing 
Construction business activity in Queensland is a significant part of the Australian 
economy: starting from just before 2002 until 2007, Queensland has the largest sustained 
growth in total value of building work in residential and non-residential developments and 
alterations, increasing from AUS$9.828 billion in 2002 to AUS$18.445 billion in 2007 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2007). QBSA enforces compliance with the QBSA Act, 
administers licensing and statutory insurance for residential building work greater than a set 
value, provides general information to consumers and licensees about building and 
constructing issues, and mediates in reported disputes between these two groups.  
In Queensland, all individuals and companies engaged in activities as a builder, trade 
contractor or building designer are required to have a valid (active) QBSA licence. The 
licensing requirements include having minimum periods of relevant experience, holding 
technical qualifications, having undertaken management training, and meeting certain 
financial requirements. While the first three requirements aim to ensure licensees meet 
minimum standards in terms of knowledge and skills to undertake and manage construction 
work, the fourth requirement – financial – seeks to ensure licensees have the financial 
capacity to undertake contracted building activities. The general aims of the financial 
requirements are “to promote more financially viable businesses and to foster more 
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professional business practices in the building industry” (Queensland Building Services 
Authority, 2004, p.1). These financial requirements include limiting annual turnover to 
defined levels of tangible assets, and setting minimum liquidity levels to increase the 
likelihood of debts being met when they fall due. Setting such financial limits is expected to 
minimise the incidence of financial failure by ensuring that 
 licensees have access to adequate capital relative to the size of their business; and  
 licensees take an active role in managing their financial affairs and keep appropriate 
financial records (Queensland Building Services Authority, 2004, p.4).  
Ultimately, the financial constraints are expected to help in protecting licensees, sub-
contractors, consumers and others from financial loss.  
Compliance with the financial licensing requirements involves meeting the following four 
tests.  
 Test 1: Net tangible assets (NTA)1 held in the business are appropriate to the annual 
turnover.  
 Test 2: Liquidity ratio2 is equal or larger than 0.8:1. 
 Test 3: Management accounts are maintained and financial reports (trading profit/loss 
statement and statement of financial position) are prepared in accordance with prescribed 
minimum intervals.  
 Test 4: Independent reviews or audits of financial information and reports are provided 
with prescribed minimum intervals.  
The amount of the prescribed liquidity ratio (Test 2) is the same for all licensees, but the 
other three tests vary in accordance with the size of the licensee’s business, based on NTA, 
and the eight QBSA licence categories. The lowest, Category 1 comprises licensees with 
NTA ranging between AUS$15,001 and $30,000, and the highest, Category 8 comprises 
licensees with NTA greater than AUS$13.3 million. Each of the eight categories has 
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prescribed minimum and maximum amounts of allowable annual turnover3 (AATO), which 
in combination with the NTA are used for Test 1 (discussed further below). Test 3 varies 
across categories by requiring preparation of financial reports at least annually by licensees in 
Category 1, half-yearly by Category 2 licensees and quarterly for all other Categories 3 to 8. 
Test 4 requires Category 1 to 3 licensees to have their annual financial reports reviewed and 
licensees in Categories 4 to 8 have their reports audited. There are significant differences in 
the requirements of a review and an audit in terms of the extent of work involved and the 
qualifications of persons undertaking the work. In the case of an audit, it must be carried out 
by a registered company auditor 4  and the auditor’s procedures must be sufficiently 
comprehensive for the auditor to express an opinion about whether the financial statements 
present fairly the financial performance and position of the licensee’s business for the 
reporting period, and whether the financial information specifically reported to QBSA 
(AATO, NTA, liquidity ratio, and details of any financial guarantees) is presented fairly. In 
contrast, for an individual to be qualified to undertake a review they have to meet the less 
onerous requirement of holding a public practising certificate from a professional accounting 
body. The review procedures are significantly less onerous than an audit in that the reviewer 
is required only to review the financial information reported to QBSA and report whether 
anything has come to their attention that would indicate the information is not presented 
fairly. These differences between and audit and review give rise to significant differences in 
direct costs in terms of the fees charged by the auditor/reviewer, and indirect costs in terms of 
establishing and maintaining formal accounting systems, internal controls and financial 
reporting processes that are subject to audits. Presumably these differential rules between the 
lower and higher licensee categories are applied on a capacity-to-pay basis, with Categories 4 
and above licensees assumed to have the financial capacity to establish the requisite 
accounting systems, reporting processes, and have those audited.   
8 
 
While the intent of imposing financial constraints and requiring independent 
reviews/audits is to minimise risks of financial failures, such constraints may also have the 
undesirable consequences of inhibiting business growth. In particular, licensees in Categories 
3 and lower may seek to avoid the significantly higher costs of establishing and maintaining 
more sophisticated accounting and internal control systems, and higher fees of a full audit 
that are applicable to Categories 4 and above. Thus, incentives may be created for those 
licensees to remain in lower categories, i.e. to stay small, and thus avoid higher reporting 
costs and (unknowingly) accepting detrimental follow on effects. 
Some parallels can be drawn here between the potential effects of financial regulation of 
building licensees in Queensland and the effects of the financial systems and reporting 
regulations imposed by SOX on US companies. SOX was a response to large corporate 
failures (e.g. Enron) and was introduced in 2002 to improve the quality of financial reporting. 
SOX regulation requires managers to establish and monitor internal systems to ensure 
accurate financial reporting, to report on those systems, and have an auditor attest to 
managers’ reports (Iliev, 2010). Acknowledging that these requirements imposed 
disproportionally higher costs on small businesses, due to the fixed component of compliance 
costs, including higher audit fees (Iliev, 2010), small firms were initially exempted from 
complying with the SOX financial reporting requirements. Gao et al. (2009) suggest that this 
created incentives for firms to stay small, and they, and others (Ribstein, 2002; Holstrom and 
Kaplan, 2003; Romano, 2005) provide evidence in support of this assertion by finding that 
for small businesses the costs of compliance with the SOX financial reporting requirements 
exceed benefits. Where regulation constrains the growth of firms, there are likely to be 
undesirable consequences if employment, wealth creation and real investment are affected 
(Gao et al., 2009).  
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Study period and data 
QBSA participated in a larger research project on modelling construction business 
performance, funded through the Cooperative Research Centre on Construction Innovation, 
and provided the researchers with access to their (de-identified) licensee database. Relevant 
data for the period October 2, 2000, and June 26, 2006, were extracted from that database. 
The QBSA financial requirements for licensing remained unchanged over the study period. 
The QBSA data are protected by State legislation and are not publicly available. Access to 
that data therefore provides a unique opportunity as prior academic research on the Australian 
construction industry is limited, with Lynch (2003) providing the only quantitative evidence 
on failure rates of homebuilder organisations between 1986 and 1996.  
Table 1 presents the distribution of QBSA licensees by type as at 19 April 2006, and 
Table 2, according to category. These tables show that 83 percent of licensees are individuals 
and 72 percent are in the self-certified categories, which largely comprise individuals 
operating as sub-contractors, such as plasterers, plumbers, etc. Table 2 also shows that of 
those who are licensed by financial Category 1 (smallest) to 8 (largest), the vast majority are 
in Categories 1, 2 and 3.5 Licences are issued or renewed annually only after so-called 
‘Industry Deemed-to-Comply Financial Requirements’ are met by the entity (Queensland 
Building Services Authority, 2004, p.41).  
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 here] 
As indicated previously, categories of licensees are determined using two financial 
measures: NTA and AATO. Table 3 shows the ranges of NTA and AATO for the relevant 
categories in this study (Category 2 to 4). These ranges are valid from 2001 to 2006. Based 
on the NTA of a category, an AATO range is calculated, within which a licensee’s current 
turnover (CT) must lie. The marginal AATO values are derived through a heuristic formula 
that maps NTAmin and NTAmax on AATOmin and AATOmax, respectively. For individual 
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licences, the determination of the maximum AATO may either be derived from that heuristic 
formula or determined through the financial report (independent review or audit) provided, 
whichever of the two maximum values is less. The actual CT needs to fall within the bounds 
of AATOmin and AATOmax, but may exceed the upper bound by a margin of up to 10 percent 
“for the sake of reasonable flexibility and ease of administration” (Queensland Building 
Services Authority, 2004, p.9). As shown in Table 3, licensees falling into these three 
categories are also required to maintain a liquidity ratio of at least 0.8 to 1.  
Categorisation in accordance with these financial measures then triggers the differential 
financial reporting requirements applicable to licensees in relation to the type of review 
conducted on those reports, as discussed above, and the frequency of preparing those reports. 
Category 2 licensees are required to prepare financial reports half-yearly, Category 3 and 4 
licensees have to produce quarterly reports. These differences in frequency of reporting and 
type of review/audit leads to higher costs as the category levels increase, creating incentives 
for licensees to remain in lower categories. This is particularly understandable for an industry 
that generally operates on small earnings margins (Finkel, 1997). The subjects of our analysis 
thus are licensees of Categories 2 and 3 since all higher categories (i.e. Categories 5 to 8) 
have the same reporting requirements as Category 4. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
By plotting financial data for NTA and CT, as provided by licensees to the regulator, one 
would expect them to be randomly distributed between the margins given in Table 3. 
However, a visual inspection of these scatter plots (not shown) identified large numbers of 
licensees with NTA amounts equal to or greater than NTAmax and derived AATOs equal to 
AATOmax. This observation motivated our further detailed investigation. 
 For the study period, a total of 21,959 Category 2 and 22,293 Category 3 licence 
applications or renewals were identified as having an existing start and end date, defining the 
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duration of the licence, and some financial information. For the purposes of this study the 
three items of NTA, AATO and CT for each licensee are required. Due to missing data 
related to incomplete information in the database, some licensees could not be reliably 
categorised, thus reducing the total sample sizes for Categories 2 and 3 to 19,974 and 20,413, 
respectively.  
Table 4, provides a detailed overview of the number of licences that were issued/renewed 
for various NTA versus AATO configurations over the study period. For both Categories 2 
and 3, large proportions of licences were issued or renewed based on what appears to be 
‘artificial’ data, in that there are relatively large frequencies of observations with NTA 
amounts that are equal to the dollar amounts of the category margins. For example, 5,384 of 
the Category 3 licences that were issued/renewed had NTA greater than the maximum for 
that category (i.e. more than $380,000) and AATO equal to the maximum (i.e. $10 million). 
Had those licences been categorised in accordance with their NTA, of the 5,384 
issued/renewed licences, 2,877 would have been allocated to Category 4, 1,346 to Category 5, 
1,060 to Category 6, 92 to Category 7, and 9 to Category 8. Thus, 5,384 licences are 
‘artificially’ in Category 3; such artificial categorisation distorts the actual number of licences 
that legitimately fall within each category. The frequencies shown in the last NTA and 
AATO comparison at the bottom of Table 4 indicates the allowance for exceeding the AATO 
maximum by up to 10 percent occurs only rarely for either category. However there are a 
greater number of instances where, based on the NTA amount, licences should have been 
allocated to a lower category (318 for Category 2 and 183 for Category 3).  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Figures 1 and 2 present monthly frequencies of all licences that were issued or renewed 
during the study period for each of the Categories 2 and 3, respectively. The upper graph line 
shows the total licence issues/renewals and the lower graph line shows frequencies of 
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licences that are ‘artificially’ in a different category than they would be if categorised in 
accordance with their NTA. The seasonal patterns in both figures reflect that licenses are 
issued at all times during the year, although most are in the months of September, October 
and November. According to QBSA representatives, most licence renewals occur  just after 
the financial year-end (June) when financial documents have been prepared for tax purposes 
and the three-month window thereafter allowed by the tax office for final submission.  
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 here]  
Figures 3 and 4 display the total yearly number of licensees in each Category 2 and 3, 
respectively, and  licence numbers that lie within (legitimate) or outside (other and underrated) 
prescribed boundaries (see Table 3 and the next section for a formal definition of ‘legitimate’ 
and ‘underrated’). These numbers are not readily available in the database, rather, they are 
derived from the financial and building activity history and therefore dependent on data 
availability. Existing financial information reflects the position at the date of licence issue, 
but does not guarantee that the licensee is categorised as ‘active’ throughout the entire licence 
period. The financial history table in the database contains large amounts of data for inactive 
licensees which are not considered here. That is, should a licence not remain active until the 
end date (expected renewal date), we do not consider it for the period in question.  
[Insert Figures 3 and 4 here] 
 
Research method 
In examining whether the QBSA licensing requirements have had unintended 
consequences, our analysis first considers the ‘legitimacy’ of categorisation for licences in 
Categories 2 and 3, and then the analysis is extended to whether such categorisation  is 
associated with business failure (licence termination). For the first part of the analysis, the 
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population of licences in Categories 2 and 3 are classified into two groups according to their 
reported NTA and AATO as follows:  
 Legitimate licences (LL), if NTA  [NTAmin; NTAmax)    AATO < AATOmax; and  
 Underrated licences (UL), if NTA  NTAmax     AATO = AATOmax. 
In Categories 2 and 3, LLs and ULs account for 96.6 percent of all licences (we exclude 
what may be called overrated licences). The main analysis investigates these four groups 
(Category 2 legitimate; Category 2 underrated; Category 3 legitimate and Category 3 
underrated) in relation to the financial reporting requirements. The following four issues are 
the specific focus of the analysis: 
1. The first issue relates to actual (or current) annual turnover versus AATO. According 
to the QBSA financial requirements for licensing, CT is not permitted to exceed 
AATOmax for the particular licence category. However, we detected significant 
numbers of such rule violations and discuss them in light of policy implications. 
2. The second issue is the economic use of the ratio of CT to NTA. The ratios calculated 
using the margins for AATO and NTA for each of the licence categories implicitly 
express the assumed expectations of the regulator for the industry. However, the data 
show that the majority of licences do not fall within these ranges.  
3. There appear to be incentives for licensees to report financial information that would 
place their licences in lower categories (‘underrated’) to avoid the more onerous 
reporting requirements of higher categories. That is, the requirement for an 
independent review of financial information for a Category 3 licence, is less costly 
than the Category 4 requirement of an independent audit. In the case of Category 2 
licences, the minimum financial reporting frequency is half-yearly as opposed to 
quarterly reporting for all higher categories. Issue three thus concerns licence 
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termination frequencies (see Table 6 for modes of licence termination and frequencies) 
in all four pools and likely consequences to future policy implementation. 
4. Following on from the previous points, the observation of licensees apparently 
reporting ‘artificial’ data gives rise to questions about enforcement practices in this 
context, given that reporting false (financial) information to a regulatory authority 
usually attracts severe penalties elsewhere (e.g. tax return). It also raises the question 
of whether the observed reporting of artificial financial data can be explained by the 
competing theoretical perspectives of opportunistic behaviour or accounting 
conservatism. This is issue four. 
 
Issue 1: current turnover and allowable turnover comparisons 
Table 5 presents comparative statistics for the relationship between CT and AATO, and 
between the LL and UL for each of the Categories 2 and 3. The bottom rows for each licence 
category show significant numbers of instances where licences were issued/renewed, but the 
licensees’ CT exceeded AATOmax by more than the permissible additional 10 percent (764 
out of 38,230). The extent of this apparent non-compliance is surprising and undermines the 
credibility of the rules as regulatory control mechanisms. When this finding was brought to 
the attention of the regulator in private communications, the researchers were advised that the 
matter would be investigated; the outcome of that investigation is not known to us.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Table 5 also shows the mean and standard deviation of the absolute difference between 
CT and AATO for each of the groups of licences. These statistics provide an indication of 
how well, that is, how close these two measures, on average, are to each other, as evidence of 
whether the heuristically derived AATO is well-determined relative to observed CTs. The 
large standard deviations for all groups shown in Table 5 indicate that CT and AATO do not 
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lie close to one another, which puts into question the magnitude of AATO as an absolute 
upper limit. Further and as expected, in both Categories 2 and 3, the means for the legitimate 
groups are smaller than the means for the underrated groups, due to the unaccounted for 
spread of underrated licences into what should be higher categories. In both Categories 2 and 
3, licences with CTs less than or equal to the corresponding AATO have smaller standard 
deviations than those which exceed their allowable turnover as they are bound by the 
category’s financial requirement margins.  
   
Issue 2: the rate of NTA turnover 
      The financial ratio CT to NTA is a measure of asset turnover, which reflects the level of 
revenue generated by the tangible assets. Deriving the theoretical NTA turnover ratios as 
calculated from the prescribed margins of NTA and AATO (given in Table 3) yields expected 
target ranges between 15.15 and 19.23 for Category 2, and between 19.23 and 26.32 for 
Category 3. These target NTA turnover ratios are used as benchmarks with which we 
compare actual NTA turnover ratios for each of the LL and UL.   
Figures 5 and 6 display the (relative) frequencies of the asset turnover ratios for the LL and 
UL in each of Categories 2 and 3, respectively. It would be expected that the observations are 
uniformly distributed within the QBSA target ranges identified above. However, the plots 
show that the vast majority of NTA turnover ratios are smaller than QBSA’s promoted range. 
Comparing the ratio patterns within single categories between the LL and UL shows a shift 
towards lower ratios for UL. In the case of Category 2, while the patterns are similar, the 
average ratio for the LL (LL = 9.60) is greater than for the UL (UL = 7.67); this difference is 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level.6 There are also different ‘norms’ for each category, 
with Category 2 ratios following a Weibull distribution, and Category 3 ratios an exponential 
distribution. Results from data fits to the theoretical distributions are very good (for Category 
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2 UL and LL, respectively, 2-parameter Weibull distributions ( ߣ ൌ 8.6 , ݇ ൌ 1.4 ) with 
݌ ൌ 0.98, ߯ଶ ൌ 0.001 and (ߣ ൌ 10.5, ݇ ൌ 1.6) with ݌ ൌ 0.97, ߯ଶ ൌ 0.001; for Category 3 
UL and LL, respectively, exponential distributions with ݕ ൌ 0.16 כ exp ሺെ0.17 כ ܥܶ ܰܶܣ⁄ ሻ 
with ݌ ൌ 0.93  and ܨ ൌ 178  and ݕ ൌ 0.15 כ exp ሺെ0.15 כ ܥܶ ܰܶܣ⁄ ሻ  with ݌ ൌ 0.95  and 
ܨ ൌ 252). The different distributions which the data follow are a rather unexpected result and 
show firm size relevance (as measured by NTA).  
  [Insert Figures 5 and 6 here] 
The average lower turnover yield (relative to NTA) of the larger Category 3 rather than 
the smaller Category 2 licensees, is contrary to the usually reported positive correlation 
between firm size and an entity’s opportunities to, for example, grow (e.g. Kreitl et al., 2002) 
or technologically innovate (Rothwell and Dodgson, 1994): thus Figures 5 and 6 display the 
outcome of regulatory failure. 
The large number of NTA turnover ratios falling below the lower bound of the QBSA 
‘target’ ratios may not be a concern to the regulator in that it could be seen as licensees 
operating conservatively and well within their capacity. Operating at a much lower level than 
maximum capacity also provides a buffer in the case of financial hardship, when assets could 
be sold off and avert imminent risk of failure. While this may be desirable in the short-term, 
persistently low NTA turnover ratios have undesirable consequences in the longer term. Low 
NTA turnover ratios suggest inefficiencies with underutilised tangible assets, which, as could 
reasonably be expected for construction industry businesses, result in the business slipping 
into severe financial difficulties at some point in the future. In order to provide empirical 
evidence on the impact of low NTA turnover ratios, we examine this issue with respect to 
defaulted licences in the following section.  
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Issue 3: Analysis of licence terminations 
Table 6 presents information about licences that were terminated by the regulator due to 
bankruptcy, liquidation, voluntary administration or other licence defaults during the study 
period, and shows that there are a total of 90 in Category 2 and 120 in Category 3. Voluntary 
administration accounts for about 59 percent of all terminations in both categories. This 
observation corresponds to findings for many Australian industry sectors given in Bickerdyke 
et al. (2001). Voluntary administration was usually followed by liquidation or a deed of 
company arrangement for those licensees.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
As licence default may occur at any time during the year, we have matched the licence 
termination date to availability of financial information that is current at that time. Due to 
missing data, the number of terminated licences remaining in our analysis is 77 for Category 
2 and 112 for Category 3. Thus, for Category 2, every 518th UL was terminated, compared to 
every 230th LL. In relation to Category 3, the difference is not as pronounced with every 230th 
UL terminated, in comparison with every 184th LL. A 2-test for independence under the Null 
hypothesis, that being categorised as LL or UL is independent of licence status (defaulted or 
not defaulted), is rejected at the 0.05 significance level for Category 2 (1 df; 2calculated=3.80; 
p-value = 0.05) and not rejected for Category 3 (1 df; 2calculated=0.13; p-value = 0.72).  
The above results do not consider the time-dependent patterns of changes of default rates in 
the data. More conclusive evidence on the existence of differing characteristics between the 
LL and UL groups are that we observe no clear tendency of a changing default frequency for 
the LL in both categories (Figure 7). However, the time patterns of licence terminations for 
the UL have an increase in frequency per unit time interval. Due to the small number of 
Category 2 UL defaults, the following analysis was performed on Category 3 only.    
[Insert Figure 7 here] 
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Figures 8 and 9 display the aggregated quarterly default frequencies for the Category 3 
LL and UL subgroups, respectively. The linear fit of the data suggests that the LL default 
pattern may follow a homogeneous Poisson process while the slope coefficient of the linear 
regression fit of the UL default pattern does not (0.077 vs. 0.186, respectively). The Poisson 
process has been used in many other applications of event occurrence rates (e.g. Lando, 1998; 
Rodriguez-Iturbe, 1987) and we use it here to model rates of default. The results for the 
Poisson fits are shown in Figures 10 and 11 with respect to the LL and UL Category 3 
subgroups. For the LL default pattern, the fit is satisfactory (7 df; 2=13.80; p > 0.05), 
whereas for the UL pattern it is not a good fit (5 df; 2=18.84; p-value exceeds 0.005 margin). 
Thus, the LL follow a constant (homogeneous) pattern that is well-described by the 
commonly-used model and the implied licence default rate is a good estimate for forecasting 
purposes. However, this model cannot be applied to the UL default rate, hence the rate is 
non-homogeneous and significantly increasing through time. While it may be an interesting 
technical exercise to find an adequately matching model, it is a line of research that is beyond 
the scope of this study.    
[Insert Figures 8, 9, 10 and 11 here] 
Given the observed NTA turnover ratios of active LL and UL for the full samples of 
Categories 2 and 3 (Figures 5 and 6), we now compare those with ratios for the terminated 
licence sub-samples (Figures 12 and 13). Although the spread of ratios for the terminated 
licences follows a similar pattern to the full sample of (active) licences, there are two 
noteworthy aspects that are discussed in the context of the contingency tables presented in 
Table 7.  
[Insert Figures 12 and 13 here] 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
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First, we note that 79.7 percent and 78.6 percent of the NTA turnover ratios for the 
defaulted LL lie outside the QBSA range, as opposed to 60.0 percent and 81.8 percent of the 
UL of Category 2 and 3, respectively. We therefore test the Null hypothesis that these 
proportions are estimates of the same amount. Given H0, the best estimates of the relevant 
proportions were derived from the combined samples. The adjusted c2 for continuity 
(Snedecor and Cochran, 1967, p.217), 1 df, equals 0.216, p = 0.642 (Category 2), and 0.411, 
p = 0.522 (Category 3). From both amounts we do not reject H0; that is, the observed 
differences may be due to sampling errors. Thus, the NTA turnover ratio has no power to 
distinguish between defaulted LL and UL.  
Second, we test the Null hypothesis that the proportion between numbers of licences that 
lie outside and within the QBSA range for defaulted and active groups are estimates of the 
same amount. This can be achieved in various ways. Rather than using a 2x2 contingency 
table, we calculate in Table 7 the expected number of defaulted LL and UL for either inside 
or outside the QBSA range using combined sample calculations7: middle quantities, e.g. for 
defaulted LL inside the QBSA range are calculated by 15*64/69=13.913; bottom quantities 
are derived from the definite integral of corresponding Weibull (Category 2) and exponential 
(Category 3) functional forms for active licences (Figures 5 and 6, respectively); the relevant 
proportions inside the QBSA range for LL and UL are 0.0941 and 0.0635 (Category 2), and 
0.0366 and 0.0251 (Category 3), respectively; all other quantities can be derived from these 
fractions. With a 2 (1 df) of 18.43 (Category 2) and 95.82 (Category 3), both with p < 10-4, 
we reject H0 for both groups. Thus, the expected frequencies of defaulted licences, both LL 
and UL, inside the QBSA range are significantly lower than the observed levels in both 
categories in relation to the active licences (the reverse holds for observations outside QBSA 
range). Thus, licences with NTA turnover ratios that are lower than the QBSA range are less 
likely to default than those that fall within the QBSA prescribed range. Given that lower NTA 
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turnover ratios are indicative of lower levels of operating efficiency, this highlights the trade-
off between utilising assets efficiently to generate more revenue, and the risk of running into 
financial difficulties that results in business failure.         
 
Issue 4: opportunistic behaviour and discussion 
Boukendour (2007) (drawing on Coase, 1937) theorises that written contracts are 
incomplete as they do not “anticipate all the events that may occur and the various actions 
that are appropriate in these events”, due to transaction costs. In the presence of incomplete 
contracts, agents (managers) may behave opportunistically at the expense of principals 
(owners). Regulation can also be viewed as incomplete ‘contracts’ in that the cost of 
addressing every possible eventuality in regulation would far exceed any benefits. The 
findings reported above provide evidence of an incomplete regulatory environment, which, in 
turn, potentially creates conditions for opportunistic behaviour. Opportunistic behaviour may 
manifest through cheating or ‘legally’ misusing systems and has been deduced in psychology 
from, for example, the conscience model or impulse controls (Frank, 1988). Empirical 
evidence of opportunistic behaviour has been widely documented in economics (e.g. Nagin et 
al., 2002), particularly in relation to transaction cost economics (e.g. Noorderhaven, 1996). 
Pertinent to the construction industry, Loosemore and Lam (2004) discuss opportunity 
management in the health and safety environment and a number of drivers thereof, including 
(human, social, intellectual and economic) capital prospects, flexibility, luck and attitudes. 
The finding of a virtually constant ratio between the numbers of UL and LL over the study 
period (Figures 1 and 2) suggests that construction licensees systematically ‘choose’ to stay 
small, which may be indicative of opportunistic management. It is suggested that licensees 
stay small and remain in lower categories to avoid the higher direct and indirect costs 
associated with more onerous reporting requirements in the higher categories. Licensees may 
21 
 
also seek to avoid closer scrutiny of their financial affairs that an independent audit 
necessarily entails. Any irregularities detected during the audit would be noted in the 
auditor’s report, and consequently brought to the attention of the regulator, potentially 
triggering an investigation into the affairs of the licensee’s business. An alternative may be 
that personal attitude to and flexibility of remaining small (i.e. being your own boss) appeals 
to small and medium size construction licensees (from personal communication with industry 
experts and QBSA staff).  
 
Conclusions 
The QBSA licensing regulation is considered progressive in the Australian construction 
industry, providing a model for other States. Such regulation seeks to protect the interests of 
employees, contractors, creditors, consumers and the wider public. Grouping licences into 
QBSA categories, which impose different reporting requirements across categories, creates 
incentives to provide ‘artificial’ financial data to self-categorise into lower categories. The 
findings of this study indicate that a large proportion of licensees (up to 32 percent) are in 
lower categories than they should be, as indicated by their financial data. While the intention 
of the QBSA licensing regulation is to promote efficiency in the construction industry and 
protect creditors and consumers from adverse effects of construction business failures, the 
regulation appears to have at least two unintended consequences8.  
First, one of the key objectives of QBSA is to monitor licensees for signs of financial 
distress and take action to minimise the adverse impact of defaulting businesses on the 
construction industry and the wider community. The increasing Category 3 UL default rate 
through time is of some concern; and the lesser scrutiny that the UL subject themselves to 
leads (more and more often) to a moral hazard situation where a construction business 
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approaching failure may not be detected before severe adverse consequences are felt by sub-
contractors, clients and the wider community.  
The second unintended consequence may be that in setting ‘target’ AATO limits for 
particular levels of NTA, the regulator is explicitly prescribing an industry norm. Observed 
large differences in the absolute size of average current and allowable turnover, indicate that 
either the formula used to determine allowable turnover do not accurately reflect the market 
(i.e. do not capture the magnitude of business activity of licensees), or the average licensee 
does not use the available NTA to its full potential, as suggested by an overwhelming 
majority of licensees having NTA turnover ratios lower than the QBSA target range. 
Encouraging licensees to generate actual turnover at even lower levels relative to their NTA, 
on the assumption that lower turnover levels indicate they are operating their businesses 
prudently, could in fact lead to underutilisation of assets and inefficiencies in the construction 
industry, again defeating the intent of the licensing regulation.  
Findings that construction licensees are categorising themselves as smaller to avoid the 
more onerous and costly reporting of higher licensee categories are consistent with findings 
in the US that SOX regulation created incentives for small firms to stay small to avoid the 
costs of compliance with the SOX financial reporting requirements (see Ribenstein, 2002; 
Holstrom and Kaplan, 2003; Romano, 2005; Gao et al., 2009). Where regulation inhibits 
business growth, there are likely to be the undesirable economic consequences of adverse 
effects on employment, investment and wealth creation (Gao et al., 2009). Insights provided 
by the findings of this study are of importance in policy design, and useful for consideration 
by the regulatory body and others which plan to introduce similar approaches. 
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Table 1 Distribution of QBSA licensees by type as at 19 April 2006 
  Individual Company Total
 Builder 15,364 5,571 20,935
 Trade contractor 30,305 5,271 35,576
 Supervisor 6,285 0 6,285
 Building certifier 384 0 384
 Total 52,338 10,842 63,180
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Distribution of QBSA licensees by category as at 19 April 2006 
Category Self-certified trader
Self-
certified 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 N/A Total
No. of 
licensees 17,949 27,714 829 4,382 5,086 110 91 162 90 98 6,285 62,796
Percent of 
licensees 29 44 1 7 8 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2 10 100
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 QBSA financial control criteria (QBSA, 2004, p.41) 
Category 
NTA 
(NTAmin - NTAmax] 
($000) 
 AATO  
(AATOmin - AATOmax]
($000) 
Liquidity
ratio 
Minimum  
financial 
monitoring 
requirements 
Annual  
financial  
review 
requirements
2 33-130 500-2,500 0.8 : 1 Half-yearly Independent review 
3 130-380 2,500-10,000 0.8 : 1 Quarterly Independent review 
4 380-630 10,000-25,000 0.8 : 1  Quarterly Audit report
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Table 4 Licence sample sizes for Category 2 (upper entries) and Category 3 (bottom entries)  
 
                         
           
< NTAmin:  NTAmin     ≤ NTAmax : > NTAmax : Total 
൏ NTA୫ୟ୶ሺିଵ ஼௔௧.ሻ ൌ NTA୫ୟ୶ሺିଵ ஼௔௧.ሻ  < NTAmax = NTAmax   
< AATOmin:        
               ൏ AATO୫ୟ୶ሺିଵ ஼௔௧.ሻ 0 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
                 ൌ AATO୫ୟ୶ሺିଵ ஼௔௧.ሻ 0 0 
318 
183 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
318 
183 
 AATOmin  ≤ AATOmax:       
                         < AATOmax 
0 
0 
408 
412 
16,115 
13,264 
1 
1 
2 
7 
16,526 
13,684 
                         = AATOmax 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5 
2 
2,928 
1,121 
182 
5,384 
3,115 
6,507 
> AATOmax:       
                  ≤ 1.1*AATOmax 0 0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
2 
11 
5 
28 
8 
39 
                  > 1.1*AATOmax 
0 
0 
0 
0 
7 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
7 
0 
Total 0 0 
726 
595 
16,128 
13,266 
2,931 
1,133 
189 
5,419 
19,974 
20,413 
 
NTA(-1Cat.)max: maximum NTA amount of the next lower category 
 
 
Table 5 Sample means and standard deviations for |CT – AATO| 
 
LL UL 
No. of 
licences 
Mean (standard 
deviation) 
($) 
 
No. of  
licences 
Mean (standard 
deviation) 
($)) 
 
C
at
eg
or
y 
2 
CT  AATO 15,259 773,670  (448,440) 3,072 1,538,682 (847,966) 
AATO < CT  1.1*AATO 312 42,834 (1,267,281) 12 96,815 (2,501,187) 
CT  1.1*AATO 15,571 759,026 (450,498) 3,084 1,533,072 (845,135) 
CT > 1.1*AATO 544 1,010,624 (3,457,499) 26 4,865,077 (12,976,907) 
C
at
eg
or
y 
3 CT  AATO 13,020 3,898,726 (2,848,569) 6,420 7,264,733 (5,255,310) 
AATO < CT  1.1*AATO 98 179,135 (5,522,738) 37 511,545 (10,004,700) 
CT  1.1*AATO 13,118 3,870,938 (2,824,463) 6,457 7,226,036 (5,212,999) 
CT > 1.1*AATO 146 3,217,448 (11,645,990) 48 6,410,691 (14,875,243) 
 
Factor 1.1 is derived from the QBSA 10 percent ‘exceedance’ permit 
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Table 6 Licence default information coupled with available financial information  
 
No. of licence terminations No. of licence terminations with available NTA and AATO data 
Ratio between licence 
terminations and no. of licences 
issued 
To
ta
l 
B
an
kr
up
tc
y 
Li
qu
id
at
io
n 
V
ol
un
ta
ry
 
ad
m
in
is
tra
tio
n 
O
th
er
 
To
ta
l 
LL
 
U
L:
 
N
TA
 =
 N
TA
m
ax
 
U
L:
 
N
TA
 >
 N
TA
m
ax
    
 O
th
er
 
LL
 
U
L 
Category 2 90 13 22 51 4 77 70 5 1 1 r = 0.434% (=70/16,115) 
r = 0.193% 
(=6/3,110)  
Category 3 120 8 30 75 7 112 72 5 32 3 r = 0.543% (=72/13,264)  
r = 0.569% 
(=37/6,505)  
 
 
 
 
Table 7 Contingency tables with respect to proposed QBSA target ranges. Top: actual 
numbers; middle/bottom: expected numbers  
 Defaulted Active 
Inside QBSA range Outside QBSA range Inside QBSA range Outside QBSA range 
Category 2 
LL 
13 
13.913 
6.022 
51 
50.087 
57.978 
1,773 
1,703.286 
1,516.512 
14,342  
14,411.714 
14,598.579 
UL 
2 
1.087 
0.318 
3 
3.913 
4.683 
259 
328.714 
197.485 
2,851 
2,781.286 
2,912.515 
Category 3 
LL 
15 
14.272 
2.562 
55 
55.728  
67.438 
757 
693.091 
485.499 
12,507 
12,570.909 
12,778.538 
UL 
6 
6.728  
0.828 
27 
26.272 
32.172 
276 
339.909 
163.276 
 6,229 
6,165.091 
6,341.725 
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Figure 1 Monthly licence numbers (issued/renewed) for Category 2. Top line: all; bottom 
line: NTA ≥ NTAmax and AATO = AATOmax  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Monthly licence numbers (issued/renewed) for Category 3. Top line: all; bottom 
line: NTA ≥ NTAmax and AATO = AATOmax  
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Figure 3 Yearly (ending 26 June) proportions of UL and LL Category 2 licensees 
 
Figure 4 Yearly (ending 26 June) proportions of UL and LL Category 3 licensees 
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Figure 5 Relative frequencies of financial ratios (CT divided by NTA) for LL and UL in 
Category 2, and QBSA target ratio range 
 
Figure 6 Relative frequencies of financial ratios (CT divided by NTA) for LL and UL in 
Category 3, and QBSA target ratio range 
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Figure 7 Dates of UL and LL Category 2 and 3 licence terminations 
 
 
 
Figure 8 Quarterly default frequencies for LL in Category 3 
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Figure 9 Quarterly default frequencies for UL in Category 3 
 
 
Figure 10 Fitted Poisson distribution to the count of the number of defaulted Category 3 LL 
licences 
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Figure 11 Fitted Poisson distribution to the count of the number of defaulted Category 3 UL 
licences 
 
 
Figure 12 CT/NTA ratio for terminated LL and UL of Category 2, and QBSA target ratio 
range 
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Figure 13 CT/NTA ratio for terminated LL and UL of Category 3, and QBSA target ratio 
range 
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Endnotes 
 
                                                 
1 NTA = total assets - total liabilities - intangible assets. 
2 Liquidity ratio = [(current assets – inventory)/(current liabilities – current financial institution facilities)]. 
‘Current assets’ are assets that are convertible to cash within 12 months; ‘current liabilities’ are liabilities that 
will fall due for payment within 12 months; ‘current financial institution facilities’ includes the current balance 
of bank and similar financial institution loans (Queensland Building Services Authority, 2004).  
3 AATO = (NTA-NTAmin) x (AATOmax -AATOmin) / (NTAmax -NTAmin) + AATOmin. 
4 Registered company auditors must meet stringent professional qualifications requirements in accordance with 
the Corporations Act 2001 and be approved by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission.  
5 The QBSA database has relational structure. Information relating to licence issuing/renewal, financial 
information and licence default reside in different tables. Within single tables, variables and keys are interlinked 
and not all necessary information, for a licensee at all relevant dates, was available such as to synchronise and 
validate the final data fields used in the various analyses reported on. The numbers in Table 1 and 2 represent 
the population of QBSA licensees to give an indication of the size of the Queensland construction sector. 
Sample sizes used are marginally smaller than the population sizes, thus the results do not suffer from loss of 
generality. 
6 One sided-test for H0: LL =UL at =.01, samples are not Normally distributed. Sample standard deviations, 
seLL = 15.36 and seUL = 11.01. Reject H0 if zcalculated  2.33. zcalculated = 8.35. 
7 An equivalent method would be to fit the frequency distributions of Figures 12 and 13 with the relevant 
probability density function for each category and infer from the goodness of fit statistics. 
8 Gao et al. (2009, p.459) note ‘unintended consequences’ to mean outcomes of regulation are “either 
unanticipated by the regulator or not the objective of the regulation”. Based on the results reported, we suggest 
the term ‘undesired outcomes’ may be a more suitable term as an indicator of the need for corrective action. 
 
 
